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He is not any Tom, Dick, or Harry. He is "HWA," "King Arthur,"
or "The Harry." And he is not only a legend in his own mind or office.
He is someone who has become so identified with Canadian law, legal
scholarship, and legal education that it is difficult to talk about their
development and trajectory over almost the past half century without
grappling with his legacy. He has left his mark on the Canadian
academic scene in a way that few others have or could ever hope to do.
This is nowhere more apparent than in his moulding of Osgoode Hall
Law School ("Osgoode") and York University. Both institutions owe
much of their reputation and prestige to his guiding energy. But his
influence stretches much further afield. He is an intellectual colossus
whose influence and vision have enriched the whole of Canadian law
and learning; his name has become synonymous with an
uncompromising combination of erudition, imagination, rigour, and
dedication. It is to be hoped that his distinctive work and engaging
wisdom will continue for many years to come.
This symposium on the occasion of Harry Arthurs' retirement is
a small gesture of respect and recognition for his unparalleled
contribution to Canadian law and letters. Indeed, as impressive as it is, a
sketch of the basic landmarks in his career fails to capture the true
measure of his worth. After completing his graduate work at Harvard
University, Harry joined Osgoode's faculty in 1961. He went on to
become Dean of the law school and, in 1985, was appointed President of
York University. Widely known and honoured for his academic
achievements by the Royal Society of Canada and by the British
Academy, he was awarded the Killam Prize in the Social Sciences in
2002 and the first Bora Laskin Prize for contributions to Labour Law in
2003. He is a member of the Order of Canada and has received eight
honorary degrees for his outstanding work in education and law. His
scholarship has considered labour law, legal education, administrative
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law, law and globalization, legal ethics, and governance of the legal
profession. It is a truly enviable record that speaks for itself in terms of
his stature and standing in the academic community.
This symposium is a mere sampling of the range and depth of his
scholarship, leadership, and overall influence. So wide-ranging and
encompassing is his work that the difficulty was more in what to include
than what to leave out.' The objective is to celebrate Harry's scholarship
and achievements; it is not intended to be a retrospective appraisal of
Harry's work and ideas. Rather, the ambition is to pick up on some of
the themes and challenges in his writings-legal pluralism, law-and-
society, progressive education, administrative law, legal history, legal
profession, labour relations, and globalization-and to plumb the
contemporary resonance of those interventions. True to his own
scholarly temper, it was thought that the best celebration of Harry's
career would be to use his body of work to launch a more future-
oriented exploration of related directions and initiatives in law and
education. In short, it is less about dwelling on the past and particulars
of Harry's work and more about using those achievements to pursue
related ideas and provocations in others' work. A host of celebrated
speakers and commentators immediately and enthusiastically accepted
an invitation to take part. This volume contains the wonderful and
stimulating essays that were presented at the symposium.
The true measure of Harry's worth is to be found less in the
formal landmarks of his stellar career and more in the tone and
sensibility that he set. He has been an inspirational force and example to
all those scholars who have sought to hold legal education and
scholarship up to a more challenging and rigorous vision of themselves.
In this sense, while certainly no jock himself, Harry is an Olympian
scholar who has egged-on and chivvied his colleagues to run faster, jump
higher, and, in the process, become stronger-citius, altius, fortius. Like
the founder of the modern Olympic movement, Pierre de Coubertin,
Harry's spirit has, typically, found its most memorable vocation in urging
others to perform to the best of their critical ability: "the most important
'See Harry Arthurs' Curriculum Vitae, (2006) Osgoode Hall L.J. i.
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thing ... is not the triumph but the struggle ... [and the] essential thing is
not to have conquered but to have fought well."' Like many others, I
have been a grateful beneficiary of that demanding encouragement; my
work has prospered enormously from his good-natured chastisement
and unrelenting motivation. While it is doubtful that I have lived up to
the highest ideals that Harry demands of himself and others, I have
become a better scholar by dint and courtesy of Harry's extraordinary
efforts and exacting standards. He is the best of taskmasters and the
warmest of critics.
Harry and I first met in 1977 in London. Whereas I was a callow
graduate student and insufferably cocky individual, he was a seasoned
and sophisticated campaigner in the academic trenches. The venue was
a large office at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in Russell
Square, and the occasion was an exploratory interview about a junior
position at Osgoode. I was interested in going over to Canada to escape
the stuffy confines of the contemporary English academic scene and to
advance my academic career. With the self-assurance of youth and
ignorance, confident that Canada would surely be delighted to benefit
from my newly-coined law degrees and barrister's qualification, I asked
this imposing character what my qualifications might get me in Canada.
Harry's response was sharp and to the point-"a cup of coffee?"
Looking back, this seems to be about right and entirely deserved for one
with my unreconstructed colonial mentality. At the time it was one of
the deflationary experiences of my fledgling career. Yet it began a
relationship which has now, as boy and man, stretched to almost thirty
years. What began in conceit and intimidation, however, has now moved
on to respect and affection on both sides. Of course, I still occasionally
stand slightly in awe of Harry's huge intellect, critical intelligence and
enormous capacity for scholarly enterprise. But, for the most part, I am
now able both to buy Harry cups of coffee and go toe-to-toe with him on
the scholarly issues of the day.
So, in this short introductory essay to the symposium, I intend to
chance my friendship with Harry and to switch the roles of our first
meeting. I want to interview Harry (or, more accurately his work) and
ask some challenging questions about its overall stance and perspective.
As a legal theorist, I will concentrate on the deep jurisprudential
2 Olympic Creed, online: The Olympic Movement <http://www.olympics.org.uk/
olympicmovement/olympicmovement.asp>.
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commitments that seem to animate his scholarship. In doing so, my goal
is not to unravel or invalidate his work, but to take it seriously and
signally as a major source of insight into the Canadian legal mind-set
and prevailing intellectual milieu. In the spirit of HWA himself, I wish to
push and prod him a bit in a brief exercise of the kind of scholarship
which he has cultivated and nurtured throughout his illustrious career. It
is intended to be less of a damp squib at the party and more of a live
firework at the celebration. In a congratulatory volume such as this, he
would accept and, hopefully, expect nothing less of me.
There are many Harrys. After all, he is a self-proclaimed
pluralist. Or at least he is some of the time. Stretching across the vast
expanse of his considerable scholarly oeuvre, there are a number of
different and underlying motifs. While Harry is not always explicit in his
jurisprudential attachments, it is possible to identify two major and, I
suggest, conflicting themes in his scholarly studies. On the one hand, he
is an unapologetic critic of centralism and offers a pluralist-inspired
demolition of its intellectual pretensions; this is most apparent in his
highly-regarded Without The Law.3 On the other hand, however, he has
also taken a less-than-pluralist stance in his efforts to transform the
enterprise of legal education and research; this is most fully showcased
in the celebrated Law and Learning Report.4 I maintain that these
battling approaches not only generate a productive critical tension in
Harry's work, but also potentially undercut its ultimate cogency and
appeal. Accordingly, I want to show that, although Harry is a pluralist
some of the time, he is distinctly un-pluralist the rest of the time. When
it comes to his descriptive scholarship, he is a pluralist; but when it
comes to the normative or prescriptive strain of his scholarship and
administrative activity, he is most definitely not-and this is no bad thing.
As a pluralist scholar, he rejects the formalist mindset that
dominates, even if less so and in more sophisticated modes, legal
3 H.W. Arthurs, "Without the Law": Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in
Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).
' The Consultative Group on Education in Law, Law and Learning: Report to the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services,
1983) [Law and Learning].
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academe. Despite cries that "we are all realists now,",5 HWA knows that
this is mere facade. His best work, especially Without The Law, is
devoted to playing out that pluralist critique. It is a dismissal of legal
centralism as both a valid historical phenomenon and as a universal
world view. In Without The Law, Harry offers an extended historical
critique of the formalist approach that is dominant to both lawyering
and legal theory, with especial reference to administrative law and its
nineteenth-century development. Moving stylishly between general
theory and detailed practice, he skewers the centralist tendencies to
both designate as law only those formal edicts that emanate from the
state and to understand law as being "a thing apart from society, politics,
or economics."6 In particular, Harry is skeptical about the distinct and
self-serving identification of law with, among other things, "authority,
justice, rationality."7 Indeed, for HWA, it is particularly depressing that,
not only do lawyers see law as a set of formalized rules and intellectual
habits, but that "life should imitate art, that the centralist paradigm
should be enshrined in the rules of positive law, that pluralism should be
suppressed ... [and that there is] this subordination of life to law."'
The power and insight of Harry's critique, however, is to be
found in the way he painstakingly strips away these formalist pretensions
to demonstrate how law in the nineteenth century (and he argues largely
up to the present day) operated as an ideology and as "a means of
advancing and legitimating political positions and of mystifying and
concealing the very existence of those positions."9 In contrast to this
impoverished and deceptive centralist way of thinking, Harry juxtaposes
an historical and jurisprudential account of law that is much more
pluralist in scope and substance. The prime attribute of this pluralist
account is that the legal process is largely informal and bottom-up in its
growth and legitimacy. The law is more functional than positivist (in
other words, it seeks to meet certain social purposes rather than operate
as a closed system), more organic than static (it is a living activity more
than a fixed thing, one that responds to and impacts upon its informing
' Supra note 3 at 1.
6 ibid. at 11.
7 Ibid. at 4.
8 Ibid. at 7.
9 Ibid.
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milieu), and more diffuse than central (it is generated at many different
sites rather than emanating from one official source). All this, of course,
takes place within the push-and-pull of vibrant political, economic and
social forces. For Harry-at least the Harry of the Without The Law
mentality-the legal enterprise is less about deliberate design and more
about contingent default; legal and administrative life goes on while
lawyers and others are making plans.
Things look slightly different if we turn to Harry Arthurs' output
as administrator and policy-wonk. This is where we meet the
prescriptive HWA, the un-pluralist pluralist. Oddly for a professed
pluralist of the Without The Law ilk, he has committed his life to the
noble cause of "policy" and, particularly, the elaboration and
implementation of educational reform.
Throughout his eminent and successful career as an academic
administrator, he has evinced a staunch belief that we can diagnose
prevailing situations, identify their failings, plan a new paradigm, and
then move actively to implement it. This relatively top-down approach is
best exemplified in his chairmanship of the Consultative Group on
Research and Education in Law ("the Group"). The conclusion of the
opening chapter to its Law and Learning Report sets up both the
challenge for the Group and the tension between a centralist and
pluralist mindset:
People are getting on with the practical tasks of educating law students, lawyers, and the
public; people are striving pragmatically to improve the quality of practice, of the legal
system, and of legal research. What strikes us, however, is the extent to which most of
these efforts lack roots in systematic planning or theoretical preparatory studies, escape
rigorous evaluation and exposure to informed, systematic criticism.'
0
Harry, as chair of the Group, however, is decidedly part of the
centralist understanding that the organic and eclectic growth of legal
studies is fundamentally lacking in systematic design and that the
pluralist pattern of development must be, at a minimum, supplemented
by a more centralist and rational model. For someone who believes that
law is an organic, decentred, and ideological product, he retains an
O Supra note 4 at 7. I am aware that Without The Law follows Law and Learning
chronologically, but there is ample evidence that Harry did not disown or alter his approach in Law
and Learning after 1985. Indeed, his work as University President, particularly in his ambitious
"2020 Vision: The Future of York University" (1992), is a powerful and emphatic illustration of his
guiding non-pluralist commitments and approach to administration.
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impressive attachment to an almost centralist command-and-control
account of development and change. There more than lingers a hefty
reliance on instrumental rationality in the Report's proposal to move
away from an "unstructured and eclectic law school curriculum" to a
more rigorous and overarching schema for legal education and research,
even if that is based upon "a plurality of educational strategies."11 In the
Law and Learning campaign for a genuine pluralism, there is clear and
unvarnished support for the merits of a detached, reflective, and
overarching reason. This seems a long way from the organic and
decentralised growth acclaimed by Without The Law and its lack of
sympathy for any approach which retains faith in the centralist creed
that "law commands, people obey, and the course of future events is
fixed.'
' 2
The preference of the Group was, ironically, to "replace
eclecticism with a new structure-pluralism-which offers a genuine
choice of identifiable alternatives."13 This shift to an "educational
pluralism" is intended to be effected by a definite, coordinated, and
almost centralized implementation of administrative structures and
programmes. In promoting a new paradigm in a "Scholarly Discipline of
Law," Harry touts the importance of a systematic and almost scientistic
approach:
while "science" in the [legal] context obviously has a different meaning than in, say,
medicine or engineering, ... it is intended to connote the systematic study, using all
possible intellectual skills, of all aspects of law, including its basic values and
assumptions, its institutions and formal rules, its outcomes and social consequences. 4
Yet this approach seems to smack of the very kind of "centralist"
thinking that Harry took such clear aim at in Without The Law when he
chastised the common law and its lawyers for "becoming self-consciously
... 'modern', 'rational', and 'scientific'.'
15
Perhaps a little too starkly, it can be asked if the real Harry
Arthurs would step forward and throw some light on this apparent
contradiction. Of course, Harry would be fully entitled to respond with
i' Ibid. at 153, 155.
12 Supra, note 3 at 2.
13 Supra, note 4 at 56.
14 Ibid. at 138.
' Supra, note 3 at 8.
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Whitman's riposte: "Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict
myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes.)"' 6 A better and more
satisfying response might be "look at what I do, not what I say." There
can be no doubt that Harry has done so much on so many fronts. The
fact that he might not have ploughed a consistent theoretical furrow
seems almost beside the point (and my emphasis on it may well appear
churlish at best). A few of those elements in the Arthurian canon of
normative commitments include:
" interdisciphned he has championed almost all work that seeks to place law in a
broader and more encompassing context;
" intolerance of sloppy thinking he has been courageous enough to give no quarter in
his drive to make law into a serious scholarly and educational pursuit;
" a more-than-liberal, less-than-radical support for democracy he has parlayed a
Fabian sensibility into a workable and practical mandate for popular emancipation;
" a resistance to concentrated power he has been uncompromising in his efforts to
disempower remaining enclaves of judicial or corporate elites;
" publib service. he has dedicated his life and career to advancing the "public
interest" in its many diverse and demanding manifestaions;
" ethical integrity he has asked of the legal profession, and of himself, that the
highest standards of professional responsibility be enhanced; and
* a Canadian sensibility he has been first and last someone who has infused all he
does with "true patriot love" for Canada and its own noble expectations.
In conclusion, it might be reported that Harry appears to be a
"constrained pluralist" in that, while opposing centralism and
homogeneity in a broad socia l sense, he does accept some of its merits
and accompanying qualities in more isolated and discrete contexts (for
example, universities). He remains more a disappointed centralist and
an almost reluctant pluralist. HWA is a card-carrying pluralist when it
comes to abandoning the formalistic pretensions of legal centralism.
But, he is a much less enthusiastic pluralist when it involves resisting the
16Walt Whitman, "Song of Myself" in Leaves of Grass (Philadelphia: Rees Welsh and Co.,
1882) at 78, online: Whitman Archive <http://www.whitmanarchive.org/works/leaves/
1882/text/81soms.htlm>.
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lingering appeal of "rationality" and its related top-down attributes, in
administering smaller and more limited domains. His is a balancing act
that demands, at the very least, subtle skills and deft judgment. Indeed,
HWA can count himself among those late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century pluralist administrators of stature and sensibility-
William Hutton, Acton Ayrton, and Herbert Mackworth-whose
achievements Harry so ably and devotedly chronicles. He is heir to their
proud tradition, which, as well as making humane and decisive
contributions to their chosen administrative areas, manages to negotiate
a relatively safe, if precarious course between the dangerous shoals of an
autocratic centralism and a debilitating pluralism. This is no small
achievement.
The. Law and Learning Report asked whether legal education
and scholarship had progressed and how it might move forward in a
more sophisticated fashion. If it has, then HWA has been a major reason
for this: he has been its most formidable mentor and champion.
However, we are not sure whether it has moved forward or what that
progress would look like. This is, in so many ways, an even greater
compliment to Harry's contribution. He has through his critical example
obliged Canadian (legal) education to come of age and to confront itself
in continuing acts of responsibility and improvement. In these efforts, he
has become the best of critics and catalysts. If you cut Harry, he bleeds
Osgoode (and, to lesser extents, York and Canada). You need not agree
with him, but you can never ignore him. He has and will continue to
leave his mark, which, I believe, will only grow stronger over the years.
Many of us, particularly those at Osgoode, work under his influence
whether we know it or not. And, when we seek to reject that influence,
we fulfill Harry's legacy most. Many thanks, Harry-you can buy me
that coffee any time.
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